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Abstract 
 
Aim: Two major findings emerging from literature regarding metacognitive accuracy were 
tested. Task difficulty and domain familiarity have been seen as two factors that affect 
accuracy and, thus, bias. The basic research question of this thesis was whether expertise 
facilitates accuracy or not. However, this thesis intended to go one step further by examining 
whether task difficulty and expertise interact in their effect on accuracy and bias. 
Method: In this experiment experts and novices students in the domain of Physics were asked 
to make confidence judgments and solve a series of problems that differed in level of 
difficulty.  
Results: Task difficulty is an important factor in accuracy. An overall tendency of 
overconfidence as task difficulty increased was observed, independent of expertise. A 
‘facilitative relation’ between expertise and accuracy was found, as expertise positively 
affected accuracy. However, there was no impact of expertise on bias. Finally, expertise and 
task difficulty did not interact in their effect on bias. 
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Introduction 
People’s self-reflective abilities and their knowledge about their knowledge have long been 
studied in order to comprehend human nature. Successful learners are able to apply a variety of 
cognitive and metacognitive skills to improve their learning (Schraw, 1994). ‘Cognitive skills are 
those that help a person perform a task, while metacognitive are those that help monitor and 
regulate his performance’ (Flavell, 1979). Simply stated, metacognition refers to one’s ability to 
know and regulate his cognitive processes (Schraw & Moshman, 1995). In the concept of 
metacognition a distinction is often made between metacognitive skilfulness and metacognitive 
knowledge (Schraw & Moshman, 1995; Veenman & Elshout, 1999). The term metacognitive 
knowledge refers to individual’s declarative knowledge about the reciprocation among his person 
characteristics, task characteristics, and the available strategies in a learning situation (Flavell, in 
Veenman, Wilhelm,  & Beishuizen, 2004), while metacognitive skills concern the procedural 
knowledge that is required for the actual regulation of and control over one’s learning activities 
(Veenman, 2011). They consist of application of strategies such as planning, monitoring, guiding, 
and correcting one’s learning and problem-solving behaviour (Veenman et al. 2004; Veenman, 
2011). 
 However, metacognitive knowledge does not lead automatically to correct utilization of 
metacognitive skills in specific task situations and it does not guarantee adequate execution of 
suitable metacognitive strategies, according to Veenman (2011). Most students can spontaneously 
acquire metacognitive knowledge but research has indicated that students show a variation in the 
adequacy of this knowledge (Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters, & Afflerbach, 2006). Metacognitive 
knowledge can often be incorrect, as learners may underestimate or overestimate their 
competences (Veenman et al. 2006) or, in case of correct knowledge, the learner may lack the 
motivation or capability to apply it to specific tasks (Veenman, 2011).  
Metacognition and metamemory 
The basic description of metacognition is that of cognition about cognition. From a 
historical perspective, knowledge of metacognition was first developed in research on memory 
(Flavell & Wellman, 1977) and the term firstly used by Flavell (1971) was ‘metamemory’.  
‘Metacognition refers to the active monitoring and consequent regulation and orchestration 
of cognitive processes in relation to the cognitive objects or data on which they bear’ (Flavell, 
1976, p. 232). It is composed of metacognitive skills, like monitoring, and is regulating cognitive 
processes (Flavell, 1987). At first place, metamemory only referred to declarative knowledge 
about one’s memory and about strategies that affect memory processes (Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 
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in Veenman, 2011). Since then different definitions have been given. Initial concepts describing 
metacognition, such as monitoring, regulation, and orchestration, have been expressed differently. 
Metacognition was presented as a process of checking, planning, selecting, and inferring (Brown 
& Campione, in Vos, 2001), as a self-interrogation and introspection process (Brown, in Vos, 
2001), as an interpretation of ongoing experience (Flavell & Wellman, in Vos 2001) or simply, as 
a process of judging what a person knows or does not know about how to accomplish a task 
(Metcalfe & Shimamura, in Vos, 2001). 
 Components of metacognitive monitoring 
 Feelings of Knowing (FOKs) 
Within memory research, the term of metacognition was introduced by Hart's (1965) 
studies on the feeling-of-knowing (FOK) (Koriat, in press). While it has been known that 
people often have feelings of knowing something they cannot recall, the accuracy of these 
feelings was not empirically assessed until the research done by Hart (1965). He found that 
individual’s FOK accuracy was greater than chance, but less than perfect (Mathe, 2002; 
Nelson, 1996). After comparing what people thought they knew (metacognitive monitoring) 
with what they actually knew (performance on a forced-choice test), he proposed the ‘trace 
access’ account (Mathe, 2002). According to that, FOK judgments represent the output of an  
internal monitor mechanism that can examine the content of memory and detect the presence 
of a solicited memory target (trace) in store. 
 However, Hart's comparison was essentially qualitative, thus did not contain any 
meaningful metric of the degree of predictive accuracy (Nelson, 1996). Almost 20 years later, 
the Goodman-Kruskal gamma correlation was shown to be a meaningful quantitive measure 
of the degree of metacognitive monitoring accuracy (Nelson, 1996). 
Feelings of knowing (FOKs) vs. Judgements of Learning (JOLs) 
 Feelings of knowing are only one of several components of metacognition that have 
been researched. Judgements of Learning (JOLs) are also a key metacognitive monitoring 
component. While Feelings of Knowing (FOKs) and Judgments of Learning (JOLs) are both 
prospective, that is, predictions about future performance, there is a crucial difference 
between them. ‘JOLs refer to predictions made during or at the end of learning that pertain to 
subsequent recall, while the aforementioned feeling-of-knowing judgments refer to 
predictions of subsequent memory performance on currently no recallable items’  (Nelson, 
1996, p.108). Furthermore, according to Veenman (2011), FOKs refer to predictions about 
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items that are not yet mastered while JOLs refer predictions about items that are already 
known by a person. 
      Nelson’s Metacognitive Model 
Nelson and Narens’ metacognitive model (Nelson & Narens, 1990; Nelson, 1996) is 
directly related to cognition, metamemory and metacognition and, thus, to this thesis. According 
to Nelson (1999), metamemory is a sub-variety of metacognition that refers to monitoring and 
control of one’s own memory during the acquisition of new information and during the retrieval 
of previous acquired information. The theory of the model is based on the hypothesis that 
cognitive processes can be organised into two levels, namely meta-level and object-level (see 
Figure 1). In that framework, cognitions are considered as object-level tasks, while judgments 
and assessments that occur at a metacognitive level are considered as meta-level tasks (Nelson & 
Narens, 1990). ‘The object level includes the basic operations, traditionally subsumed under the 
rubric of information processing, while the meta-level is assumed to oversee object-level 
operations and return signals to regulate them actively in a top-down fashion’ (Koriat, in press, 
p.4). Thus, at the object level lower-order cognitive activities take place, usually referred to as 
execution processes, while higher-order, executive processes of evaluation and planning, take 
place at the meta-level and govern the object level (Veenman, 2011). Information about the state 
of the object level is conveyed to the meta-level through monitoring processes (and actually 
inform the meta-level about what state the object-level is in), while instructions from the meta-
level are conveyed to the object level through control processes (Veenman, 2011). ‘The object-
level, in contrast, has no control over the meta-level and no access to it’ (Koriat, in press, p.4). 
These metacognitive judgments of the meta-level have been defined as being either prospective 
(i.e. judgments of learning) or retrospective (i.e. confidence judgments) (Sussan & Son, 2007; 
Koriat, in press). 
 
 
 
                         Control                                                    Monitoring  
 
 
 
 Figure 1. 
A representation of Nelson and Narens’ metacognitive model. Adapted from Nelson and Narens (1990). 
            Meta-level  
         Object-level 
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‘Generally, Nelson and Narens (1990) proposed a conceptual framework that has been 
adopted by most researchers’ (Koriat, in press, p.4). It can be concluded that the ability to make 
accurate metacognitive judgments forms the monitoring component of the framework, whereas 
the ability to use these judgments to control cognitions forms the control component (Sussan & 
Son, 2007). Based on the model presented, accurate monitoring of one’s performance is a basic 
metacognitive skill, important for effective information processing (Pressley, in Nietfeld & 
Schraw, 2002) and for self-regulation (Butler & Winne, in Nietfeld & Schraw, 2002). 
Regarding the present study, Stankov (2000) provided the original impetus for research in 
this area. His aim was to examine differences in self-monitoring between general knowledge 
tasks and perceptual tasks. More specifically, he investigated the metacognitive processes of self- 
evaluation and self-confidence in relation to task complexity, fluid intelligence and the nature of 
task. In his research self-confidence is seen as an aspect of a metacognitive process of self-
monitoring that should be thought of as residing somewhere on the borderline between 
personality and intelligence. His results revealed that self-confidence bias (overconfidence or 
underconfidence) was due to task complexity. It was shown that task complexity had an 
important effect on self-confidence and that overall self-monitoring accuracy appeared to be 
independent of the nature of the task.  
Metacognitive accuracy  
The present research will focus on metacognitive skills, and more specifically on 
monitoring. The nature of memory monitoring processes has been studied with increasing interest 
within the field of cognitive psychology over the last years (Nietfeld, Cao & Osborne, 2005).  
‘Monitoring falls under the regulation facet of metacognition and refers to one’s awareness of 
comprehension and task performance while performing a task’ (Nietfeld et al., 2005, p.9). The 
information available in order to execute a task is a cognitive variable, whereas the 
characterization of this information as sufficient in quantity and quality for solving the problem is 
a metacognitive one. Qualification of a task as easy or difficult is also a metacognitive process. 
The processes of monitoring one’s own knowledge about a specific topic or skill, and 
producing judgements about the extent of that knowledge relative to actual performance, underlie 
the term of metacognitive accuracy (Hacker, Bol, Horgan, & Rakow, 2000). Metacognitive 
accuracy is the relation between metacognition and performance. Individual differences in 
metacognitive accuracy are generally thought to reflect differences in metacognitive ability 
(Kelemen et al., 2000). Therefore, it can be seen as the expected result of a monitoring process. 
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A term widely used in metacognitive accuracy studies is calibration, first proposed by 
Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips (1982). Calibration is used to express accuracy by measuring 
the extent to which a person’s judged ratings of performance, through monitoring, correspond to 
his actual performance (Keren, 1991; Lichtenstein et al. 1982; Nietfeld, Cao, & Osborne, 2006). It 
refers to the correspondence between a subjective probability and the actual probability of correct 
response (Keren, 1991; Lichtenstein et al. 1982; Nietfeld et al. 2006). As Koriat (in press) noted, 
calibration reflects the extent to which metacognitive judgments are realistic. 
Monitoring judgments can be classified as measuring either relative accuracy or absolute 
accuracy. ‘Relative accuracy, or resolution, refers to the extent in which metacognitive 
judgments are correlated with memory performance across items’ (Koriat, in press, p.30). 
Alternatively stated, it is the accuracy of predicting performance on one item relative to another 
item (Nelson, in Nietfeld et al. 2006). Absolute accuracy, on the other hand, refers to the extent 
to which an individual is calibrated with regard to the entire criterion task (Schraw, in Nietfeld et 
al. 2006). 
In the present research terms ‘calibration’ and ‘absolute accuracy’ will be used as two sides 
of the same coin. The reason for selecting absolute accuracy for this research, and not relative 
accuracy, is that past studies have shown measures of absolute accuracy to be more sensitive to 
individual differences in ability and task variations (Maki, Shields, Wheeler, & Zacchilli, in 
Nietfeld et al. 2006).  Measures used frequently for calibration is the bias score and the accuracy 
score (Pieschl, 2009). 
The determinants of metacognitive accuracy 
A number of factors can produce differences in metacognitive performance between 
individuals and, thus, in accuracy. Three broad categories are presented in literature: Problem 
characteristics, individual differences and environmental characteristics.  
 Problem characteristics refer to task demands, task complexity and the task’s nature. 
Typical problem characteristics are: Framing of the problem (Koriat, Lichtenstein, & 
Fischhoff, 1980), instructions (Keren, 1991), choice/no choice tasks (control of the task 
from the assessor), intellectual judgement required (Dawes, 1980), number of 
alternatives, cognitive effort required (Keren, 1991), and difficulty of task (‘hard-easy 
effect’) (Lichtenstein et.al, 1982; Suantak, Bolger, & Ferrell, 1996). Test practise can 
also affect metacognitive performance (Glenberg, Sanocki, Epstein, & Morris, 1987). 
 Individual characteristics refer to one’s ability, knowledge, and domain familiarity. 
Some characteristics mentioned in the literature are: Level of confidence in one’s 
10 
 
ability or knowledge (Stone, 2000), level of expertise (Keren, Metcalfe, in Stone, 
2000), inferential processes, skills for producing appropriate probabilistic 
assessments, and social expectations of the assessor (Keren, 1991). 
 Finally, environmental characteristics refer to time concepts related to the task, such as 
the timing of judgements, predictions, or postdictions (Kelemen, Frost, & Weaver, 2000; 
Thiede, Dunlosky, Griffin, & Wiley, 2005). 
Accurate monitoring is certainly not a given (Sussan & Son, 2007). Perfect calibration occurs 
when an individual’s level of confidence corresponds to his level of performance (Stone, 
2000). ‘Literature suggests that, although people do have a sense of what they do, and do not 
know, calibration generally tends to be poor’ (Stone, 2000, p.440). People can easily be 
miscalibrated and fall into a systematic error of judgment when they assess the correctness of 
their responses (Pallier et al., 2002). This error, which is mentioned as confidence bias or as 
self-confidence bias by Stankov (2000), is one of several robust research findings associated 
with calibration. ‘Measures of under- and overconfidence are commonly used to evaluate 
calibration levels’ (Stone 2000, p.440). They are the two dimensions of confidence bias. 
‘Overconfident ratings are positive differences that result when people are assessing their 
confidence in their knowledge to be greater than what their knowledge actually is. 
Conversely, underconfidence is a negative difference that occurs when individuals 
confidence ratings are lower than their percent correct’ (Stone, 2000, p.440).  People have an 
illusion of comprehension and, as a result, perfect calibration of comprehension hardly ever 
exists, especially when domain familiarity is low and task is of moderate or extreme 
difficulty (Glenberg et al., 1987; Glenberg & Epstein, 1985, 1987; Keren, 1991).  
Problem Characteristics and Individual Characteristics 
Two major findings emerging from calibration literature regarding characteristics 
affecting metacognitive accuracy are relevant to this thesis. The first finding focuses on 
problem characteristics, specifically on task difficulty. Past research has suggested that 
people’s ability to calibrate their performance may be related to task difficulty (Schraw & 
Roedel, 1994). A pattern of overconfidence is likely to occur as the difficulty of the task 
increased (Bjorkman, 1992; Lichtenstein et al., 1982). This has become known as the 
“hard/easy effect” (Lichtenstein et.al, 1982; Suantak et al., 1996), which suggests a 
covariation between task difficulty and calibration. Confidence bias depends on task 
difficulty and, as such, people tend to be overconfident on hard tasks and underconfident on 
easy tasks (Newman, 1984; Metcalfe, 1992; Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977; Lichtenstein et 
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al., 1982). Empirical evidence demonstrated that the more difficult the task, the larger the 
degree of overconfidence will be (Keren, 1991; Newman, 1984). 
A second major finding relates to individual differences in level of expertise. Confidence 
bias appears to be related to domain familiarity. The term ‘domain familiarity’ does not imply 
only basic knowledge and experience within a domain, but also expertise with a wide range of 
knowledge and work being acquired. There are three different hypotheses about the relationship 
between domain familiarity and calibration (Nietfeld & Schraw, 2002):  
(1) The debilitative hypothesis, where ‘prior knowledge is negatively related to monitoring 
accuracy because individuals become increasingly overconfident’ (p. 133). 
(2) The no-impact hypothesis in which prior knowledge is independent from 
metacognitive accuracy. 
(3) The facilitative hypothesis, where prior knowledge improves calibration.  
In an overview of research findings, support is provided to each one of the three hypothesis 
mentioned.  Bjorkman (1992) and Nietfeld & Schraw (2002) tested these three different 
hypotheses and provided support for the facilitative hypothesis. Individuals who perform in the top 
third on a general knowledge test were better calibrated than those who score in the middle or 
bottom thirds (Bjorkman, 1992). Nietfeld and Schraw’s (2002) study also revealed that individuals 
who perform best on a general knowledge test are better calibrated than those who perform worse. 
In contrast, Glenberg and Epstein (1987) evaluated the calibration levels of music and physics 
students within and across music and physics domains and found a negative relationship between 
expertise and monitoring. According to them expertise in a domain was “inversely related to 
calibration”, supporting the debilitative hypothesis. Lastly, Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977) 
found that experts (i.e., psychology graduate students) and novices (i.e. undergraduate students), 
whose confidence was assessed after answering items, were similarly calibrated on both 
psychological and general knowledge items, thus providing support to the no-impact hypothesis. 
Results within the traditional calibration paradigm are mixed, but empirical evidence slightly 
favours the facilitative and the no impact hypothesis over the debilitative hypothesis (Nietfeld & 
Schraw, 2002) 
Interaction between expertise and task difficulty 
As was mentioned before, individuals tend to be poorly calibrated. Studies on 
confidence bias revealed that people tend to be overconfident on difficult tasks and 
underconfident on easy tasks (Bjorkman, 1992; Lichtenstein et al., 1982). But what about the 
interaction between expertise and task difficulty on calibration? It is proposed that if people’s 
overconfidence on difficult tasks is due to a lack of perfect information (Pfeifer, in Stone, 
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2000), and if a lack of perfect information decreases as knowledge, or level of expertise 
increases, overconfidence should decrease with expertise (Pfeifer, in Stone 2000). The 
interaction between domain familiarity and task difficulty in their effect on calibration was 
investigated, among others, by Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977) and by Schraw and Roedel 
(1994). In the study of Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, easy items led to no discernible 
differences in bias between novices and experts, even though a degree of underconfidence 
was observed. ‘Those who know more do not generally know more about how much they 
know’ (Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977, p.179). In contrast, difficult items led to 
overconfidence both experts and novices, but with significantly higher levels in novices, 
suggesting that novices are more susceptible to judgement bias, relative to experts. In Schraw 
and Roedel’s (1994) findings the severity of overconfidence was independent of domain 
content and, therefore, judgement bias was regarded as test-driven error. Furthermore, Spence 
(1996) and Chi, Glaser, and Rees (1982) investigated the interaction of expertise with task 
difficulty and their effects on calibration. The research by Chi et al. revealed that as problem 
complexity increased, there were some benefits of expertise regarding the accuracy of 
judgements. Spence (1996) found that experts were more able to judge the difficulty of a 
problem but they are not better calibrated than novices. Novices, on the other hand, tended to 
underestimate the difficulty and, thus, the more difficult the problem, the worse calibration 
was. In conclusion, experts are better able to judge problem difficulty, while novices appear 
to underestimate the complexity of difficult problems, resulting in worse calibration. 
The present study was designed to test whether domain familiarity and task difficulty 
interact in their effects on calibration, but also to examine whether prior domain knowledge 
induces calibration. In order to address these questions and make a clear distinction between 
individuals with general prior knowledge and particular, extensive knowledge, two categories of 
individuals were distinguished. These categories concerned domain unfamiliar novices and domain 
familiar experts in the domain of Physics. The term novice refers to someone who is new to an 
area and who does not possess a significant amount of pre-existing knowledge or skills in a 
domain (Dunphy & Williamson, 2004). Due to a lack of experience in the task domain, novice 
learners have little, or no relevant domain knowledge. 
‘In contrary, the expert has high levels of procedural knowledge and skills (knowing how) 
as well as declarative knowledge (knowing what), and contextual flexibility (knowing when and 
where) in a specific domain’ (Dunphy & Williamson, 2004, p.108). In experts, a number of aspects 
of performance are inter-linked, so as to enhance overall performance. These aspects include 
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response-based practice, embodied know-how, seeing the big picture, and seeing the unexpected 
and beginning to search for explanations (Dunphy & Williamson, 2004). 
The present study 
Based on past findings about calibration (Lichtenstein et al., 1977; Lichtenstein et al., 
1982; Keren, 1991; Nietfeld & Schraw, 2002), this thesis is oriented towards obtaining more 
evidence for the facilitative and no-impact hypotheses. The first research question is whether 
good calibration is a feature of expertise or not. It is going to be examined whether previous 
knowledge in a domain facilitates calibration. It is expected that knowledge positively affects 
performance and metacognitive accuracy, but a systematic error of judgement, that is, confidence 
bias, is expected. Confidence bias would be independent of expertise thus, supporting the no-
impact hypothesis. Simply stated, the first goal is to examine if metacognitive accuracy and the 
range of confidence bias is affected by domain familiarity. 
However, the purpose of this paper is twofold. In addition to the first research question, it is 
going to be explored how task difficulty interacts with expertise, and how this interaction affects 
the accuracy of judgements. Regarding the second research question, it is expected that both 
experts and novices will be unbiased on easy items and overconfident on moderately difficult and 
difficult ones. However, experts are expected to be better calibrated on moderately difficult and 
difficult items than novices. These expectations emerge from Nietfeld and Schraw (2002), Spence 
(1996), Schraw and Roedel (1994), Chi et al. (1982) and Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977) 
findings, described earlier. Concluding, this experiment will be conducted by comparing test-
takers’ calibration across items that range in difficulty, while participants are either domain 
familiar or domain unfamiliar to the test context. 
 Hypotheses  
1. With regard to the first research question, it is predicted that expertise, as a standing 
alone condition, does not induce good calibration. Hence calibration could be characterised as 
domain familiarity independent, supporting the no-impact hypothesis. The findings anticipated 
are poor calibration in both experts and novices. 
2. The hypothesis regarding the second research question is the anticipation of a general 
tendency of overconfidence. As task difficulty increases, overconfidence is expected to increase for 
both experts and novices. Regarding the easy tasks either no bias or underconfidence is expected 
for both groups, while in moderate difficult to difficult tasks a high level of overconfidence is 
expected for both groups. Moreover, it is predicted that expertise interacts with task difficulty in 
producing calibration, providing support for the facilitative hypothesis. Specifically, the effect of 
14 
 
interaction will be observed only in difficult tasks, leading to a relative less deteriorated 
calibration in experts in contrast to the significant deterioration of calibration in novices. 
 
 Methodology 
Participants: To investigate the impact of prior domain knowledge on metacognitive 
accuracy, 38 students with different levels of prior domain knowledge were recruited for the 
research. Participants included 17 master students from the Psychology Department of Leiden 
University and 21 undergraduate students from Physics department of the same University asked 
to participate voluntarily in the experiment. The recruitment procedure lasted 1 month. Although 
Psychology students were more advanced in years of education, the undergraduate Physics 
students were more advanced in the specific discipline and could be considered as ‘discipline 
experts’.  
  Material:  A set of 12 questions from General and Newtonian Physics was selected and 
items were categorised according to their difficulty level. Test items were divided into three levels 
of difficulty: Easy, moderate difficult, and difficult, with four questions for each level. Difficulty 
was based on different types of knowledge that novices and experts use to solve Physics problems 
from the Friege and Lind (2006) categorization. Easy problems required conceptual, declarative 
knowledge (knowledge about facts, concepts, principles of General Physics), moderately difficult 
problems required domain specific background knowledge (rules and laws of Newtonian Physics) 
and concept mapping (interconnectedness of knowledge elements, hierarchical structure, and 
abstraction of knowledge) while difficult problems were those requiring problem scheme 
knowledge (a high quality type of knowledge characterised by very profound and interlinked 
knowledge). 
 The 12 multiple choice items included four to six options. The number of options was 
independent of task difficulty. An example of the questions is presented: 
 ‘We assume that we are on the top of a very high building and we let a feather fall down in 
the presence of the air. We also assume that there is no wind. Choose the best answer: a) the 
velocity of the feather increases until it reaches ground, b) the feather starts to  fall and reaches 
the ground with same  velocity , c) the feather starts to fall with constant velocity and then 
accelerates until it reaches the ground, d) the feather accelerates until it reaches maximum 
velocity’. The complete questionnaire is presented in the Appendix. 
 A pilot study was undertaken before the material reached its final form in order to make the 
categorization in the three difficulty levels empirically based, by computing the p value of every 
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item (the proportion for answering the item correctly). Ten participants (7 novices and 3 experts), 
not participating in the main experiment, were asked to judge the difficulty of the questions first 
and then answer the questions. Corrections and substitutions of some questions, that were shown to 
be either very easy or very difficult, were the outcome of the pilot study.  
In the primary phase of the main experiment, items were categorised according to their p 
value as computed from the pilot study which varied from 3 (difficult task), 2 (moderate difficult) 
to 1 (easy). However, a final categorization of items was done by computing the p values of the 
items from the actual experimental data.  The final material of the experiment included 12 
multiple-choice items with four to six options. The experiment consisted of two phases. In the first 
phase participants’ confidence ratings were gathered on an 11-point rating scale about their ability 
to provide the correct answer for each one of the 12 problem-items. 
The second phase consisted of the same problems but now participants had to provide the 
correct answer to each question by choosing the best alternative. Thus, the first phase was 
addressing their estimated performance and the second their actual performance. Both phases were 
implemented in Macromedia by my supervisor, Dr. Marcel Veenman. The programme recorded all 
answers in a log file. 
Procedure: Participants were tested individually.  The programmed test was sent to them by 
email, followed by a set of instructions about the steps of running the Macromedia Programme. 
The instructions in the email, as well as those of the experiment were identical for both groups. 
Individuals first had to read the experimental instructions from the first page of the presentation, 
which stated that this was a two-phase experiment and described the aim of each phase. There was 
no time limit in either of the two phases. In the first phase, both the problem and the alternatives 
were presented simultaneously with the 11-point rating scale until a choice was made. The left end 
of this scale was labelled 0% confidence, while the right end was labelled 100% confidence. The 
participants made their responses by ‘clicking’ on the best estimate regarding their ability, and 
automatically moved on to the next item presented. After the last choice (12
th
) was made, meaning 
the end of phase one, instructions were presented for proceeding to the second phase. After solving 
the problems in the second phase, instructions were presented about the way materials should be 
sent to the researcher. Their estimations and answers for each of the 12 questions were logged in a 
separate file, which file they were kindly asked to send to the researcher by email.  
Design: Level of prior domain knowledge was the first independent variable (novices vs. 
experts) with two quasi-experimental groups (psychology students vs. physics students). The 
categorization with respect to difficulty of items was the second independent variable (easy, 
moderately difficult, and difficult). The two dependent variables were estimated performance and 
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actual performance, based on the confidence rate provided and the correctness of responses, 
respectively. The design was a between-subjects (experts/ novices) by within-subjects (easy/ 
moderate difficult/ difficult items) design. Performance (actual score), confidence (estimated 
score), accuracy, and bias were analysed with Repeated-measures ANOVAs.  
Results 
          In order to categorize the items according to the actual performance of the participants, 
p values of all items were computed (see table 1). Items were divided into the three categories 
of: Easy, Moderately difficult, and Difficult. 
Table 1 
P values of items 
Items 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
P values .92 .89 .18 .55 .42 .42 .53 .47 .63  .71 .34 .58 
  
 Based on table 1, the items’ final categorisation is presented in table 2. 
Table 2 
Categorization of items 
Easy items Moderately difficult items Difficult items 
1, 2, 9, 10 4, 7, 8, 12          3, 5, 6, 11  
 
    Reliabilities of the Calibration Measures 
      Reliabilities (Cronbach’s coefficient alpha) for the various measures obtained from the 
experiment are reported in Table 3. All reliabilities were considered satisfactory for an 
experimental study, following the guidelines of Guilford and Fruchter (1978; see also 
Gregory, 1996), except for the ‘difficult items’ of the performance measure. Reliability 
would be very low (Cronbach’s α =.02), if item 5 was not deleted from the ‘difficult items’. 
Examining the distribution of the answers given for item 5 revealed that the correct answer 
was given by 42.1% of the participants, while one alternative incorrect choice was made 
surprisingly often by 31.5% of the participants. Possibly, this incorrect alternative worked as 
a distractor. Therefore, item 5 was deleted from the ‘difficult items’ category for both the 
17 
 
estimated as well as the actual scores, resulting in: Easy (k = 4), moderately difficult (k = 4) 
and difficult (k = 3). 
                                                                 Table 3 
    Averaged Reliabilities (Cronbach’s alpha) for Estimated and Actual performance Scores 
                                                                   Items  
 
Easy 
Moderately  
 Difficult 
Difficult 
Estimated Performance .86 .87 .55 
Actual Performance .59 .71 .52 
 
   ANOVAs 
 Performance (i.e., actual item-set score), Confidence (i.e., estimated item-set score), 
Accuracy (i.e., absolute discrepancy between actual and estimated performance score) and 
Bias (i.e., positive or negative discrepancy between actual and estimated performance, 
indicating overconfidence or underconfidence) were analysed in one-way repeated-measures 
ANOVAs with level of expertise as between-subjects factor and level of difficulty as within-
subjects factor. 
The means and standard errors of actual and estimated performances are presented in Table 4 
for novices and for experts. The means are also presented in Graph 1. 
                                  Table 4  
    Means and standard errors of estimated and actual performance 
   
  Experts  Novices  
                                               Items 
 Easy 
 
Moderately 
difficult 
Difficult Easy 
 
Moderately 
difficult 
Difficult 
 M SE M SE M SE M SE M SE M SE 
Estimated 
performance 3.78 .23 3.40 
 
.46 3.05 .62 1.94 .66 1.30 .79 1.99 .86 
Actual 
performance 3.76 .43 3.20 1.03 1.77 1.42 2.41 1.12 .82 .63 .62 .83 
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  Graph 1 
 
    Estimated performance 
 Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated for the within-
subjects effect of difficulty, χ2 (2) = 6.17, p < .05. Therefore degrees of freedom were 
corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε =.86). 
 There was a significant main effect of the within-subjects independent variable, 
difficulty, on estimated performance of F(1.72,61.98) = 16.45, p < .001. Marginal means 
revealed that estimated performance on easy items (M = 2.86, SE = .08) and difficult 
items (M =2.52, SE = .12) was higher than on moderately difficult items (M = 2.35, SE 
=.10). 
 The main effect of the between-subjects independent variable, expertise, was also 
significant with F(1,36) = 91.55, p < .001. Experts made higher estimations about their 
performance (M = 3.41, SE = .12) than novices (M = 1.74, SE = .13). 
 There was a significant interaction effect between the difficulty of the item and the level 
of expertise, F(1.72,61.98)  = 17.17, p < .001. This interaction effect indicates that 
participants’ estimations of performance on items with various levels of difficulty 
depended on their level of expertise. For experts estimations decreased with increasing 
item difficulty, while novices shown a relatively high estimation for difficult items (see 
Table 3). 
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   Actual performance 
 Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was not violated for the within-
subjects effect of difficulty, χ2 (2) = .60 , p > .05. 
 There was a significant main effect of the within-subjects independent variable, 
difficulty, on actual performance of F(2,72) = 40.06, p < .001. Marginal means revealed 
that actual performance was higher on easy items (M = 3.09, SE = .13), lower on 
moderately difficult (M = 2.01, SE =.14).and even lower on difficult items (M =1.20, SE = 
.19). 
 The main effect of the between-subjects independent variable, expertise, was also 
significant with F(1,36) = 62.64, p < .001. Experts performed better (M = 2.91, SE = .14) 
than novices (M = 1.29, SE = .15). 
 There was a significant interaction effect between the difficulty of the item and the level 
of expertise, F(2,72)  = 4.77, p < .05. This interaction effect indicated that item difficulty 
had different effects on participants’ performance, depending on their level of expertise. 
For both experts and novices, as item difficulty increased actual performance decreased. 
However, for novices performance a decrease was observed both in moderately difficult  
and difficult items while for experts a decrease is observed only in difficult items (see 
Table 4). 
    Accuracy and Bias 
Participants’ estimations could have been directly compared to their actual performance in 
order to obtain the absolute accuracy or calibration score. However, we preferred also to use 
a common measure of accuracy adopted by Schraw (2009), shown below: 
                                              k  
 Absolute Accuracy = 1/k Σ |(ei – pi)|                                                                    (1) 
                                            i=1 
 where ei corresponds to a confidence rating and pi corresponds to a performance score. K is 
the number of items that belong in each category of items (k =4 for easy and moderately 
difficult items and k =3 for difficult). 
 
Bias assesses the degree to which an individual is over- or under-confidence when making a  
confidence judgment. A measure of bias used is shown below: 
                         k  
 Bias = 1/k Σ (ei – pi)                                                                                             (2) 
                       i=1                         
The difference between formulas 1 and 2 is that for formula 1 the absolute score of the 
discrepancy between confidence and performance is used. This is crucial because it allows 
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the deviation between a confidence rating and performance score to be signed positively or 
negatively, indicating overconfidence or underconfidence. The means and standard errors for 
accuracy and bias scores are reported in Table 5. 
                                                                                  Table 5 
              Means and Standard errors for Accuracy and Bias Scores for Novices and Experts  
 
   Accuracy 
 Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was not violated for the within-
subjects effect of difficulty, χ2 (2) = 0.25, p > .05. 
 There was a significant main effect of the within-subjects independent variable, 
difficulty, on accuracy of F(2,72) = 21.06, p < .001. Marginal means revealed that easy 
items (M = .27, SE = .03) and moderately difficult items (M =.30, SE = .03) were 
answered more accurately than difficult items (M = .52, SE =.04). The main effect of 
difficulty on accuracy indicates that calibration deteriorates as the difficulty of the items 
increases. 
 The main effect of the between-subjects independent variable, expertise, was also 
significant with F(1,36)= .18.22, p < .001. Experts were better calibrated (M = .29, SE = 
.02) than novices (M = .44, SE = .03). Thus, experts tend to be better calibrated than 
novices. 
 There was a significant interaction effect between the difficulty of the item and the level 
of expertise, F(2,72) = 5.11, p > .01. This interaction effect indicates that difficulty had 
different effects on participants’ accuracy, depending on their level of expertise. For easy 
items experts were more accurate than novices, but this difference in accuracy decreased 
when items become increasingly difficult (see Table 5). 
   Bias 
 Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was not violated for the 
within-subjects effect of difficulty, χ2 (2) = 0.40, p > .05. 
 
 
 
 
Novices Experts 
  Items 
Easy Moderately 
Difficult 
Difficult Easy Moderately 
Difficult 
Difficult 
M SE M SE M SE M SE M SE M SE 
Accuracy .42 .04 .35 .04 .55 .05 .11 .03 .26 .04 .49 .05 
Bias - .12 .06 .12 .06 .34 .09 .01 .05 .05 .06 .32 .08 
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 There was a significant main effect of the within-subjects independent variable, 
difficulty, on bias of F(2,72) = 23.68, p < .001. Marginal means revealed that bias scores 
were higher on difficult items (M = .33, SE = .06) than on moderately difficult items (M 
=.09, SE = .04), or on easy items (M = -.06, SE =.04). In addition to accuracy, item 
difficulty affected the direction of bias. Positive or negative mean expresses over / 
underconfidence respectively. Slight underconfidence was observed for easy items, while 
overconfidence was observed for moderately difficult and difficult items. 
 The main effect of the between-subjects independent variable, expertise, was not 
significant with F(1,36) = .02, p > .05. No significance difference was found between the 
two groups of participants when bias was used as the criterion variable. The mean score 
of bias was M = .13, SD = .05 in experts and M = .11, SD = .05 in novices.  
 The interaction effect between the two independent variables, difficulty of the item and 
expertise, on bias was not significant (F (2,72)= 1.55, p > .05). Nevertheless, it should be 
noted that for easy items a tendency for no bias was observed in experts. Novices (M = -
.12, SD = .06) were underconfident on easy items, in contrast to experts who were 
perfectly calibrated (M = .00, SD = .05; see Table 5). For moderately difficult and 
difficult items a tendency of overconfidence was observed for both groups of participants. 
Bias curves are based on bias means and presented in graph 2. It has to be noted that 
perfect calibration is acquired when bias score is equal to zero, thus degree of calibration 
is on the Y-axis.  
Bias curves for novices and experts
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Discussion 
The present research addressed two questions: 1) Whether previous knowledge in a 
domain facilitate calibration, that is, whether good calibration is a feature of expertise or not, 
and 2) Whether, and to what extent, problem difficulty interacts with expertise and affects 
metacognitive accuracy. 
Expertise 
The first purpose was to investigate the relationship between expertise and 
metacognitive accuracy. Previous research revealed mixed findings, even though theories of 
expertise predict that knowledge should be related positively to monitoring (Glaser & Chi, in 
Nietfeld & Schraw, 2002). The results of this research indicate that pre-existing knowledge in 
Physics is related to better performance and more accurate monitoring. Experts performed 
much better than novices, as was expected. There was also a main effect of expertise on 
accuracy. Experts were more accurate in their judgements; hence, they were better calibrated 
than novices throughout the whole test. This finding supports the facilitative hypothesis, 
which states that domain knowledge improves performance and monitoring. However, 
regarding confidence bias no significance difference was found between novices and experts. 
Expertise seems to have no impact on bias, lending support to the no-impact hypothesis.  
The first hypothesis anticipated poor calibration in both experts and novices, 
supporting the no-impact hypothesis. Accuracy results, however, showed a significant main 
effect of expertise. Hence, the first hypothesis was rejected with respect to accuracy.  On the 
contrary, regarding bias among experts and novices, the no-impact hypothesis was 
confirmed. Summarizing, expertise seems to positively affect performance and metacognitive 
accuracy but it does not affect bias. These findings are consistent with Nietfeld & Schraw 
(2002, exp. 1). 
           Task difficulty 
Regarding the estimated performance, participants estimated their performance 
differently on each one of the three item categories. However, performance on moderate 
difficult items was estimated as lower than on difficult items. Overall findings revealed that 
participants became less accurate as the difficulty of the task increased. Calibration 
deteriorated with increasing item difficulty. Regarding confidence bias, there was also a main 
effect of difficulty on bias, as both groups of participants became more overconfident when 
item difficulty increased. This finding is in line with the hypothesis that overconfidence is 
expected to increase with item difficulty for both experts and novices. Regarding the easy 
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tasks no bias or underconfidence was observed, consistent with predictions. The results 
further support the “hard/easy effect” (Lichtenstein et.al, 1982; Suantak et al., 1996) 
mentioned in the literature. According to this position, increasing task difficulty causes 
miscalibration of confidence judgments. Difficult tasks tend to show overconfidence and easy 
tasks tend to show good calibration or even underconfidence.  
Expertise and task difficulty 
The results revealed a partial interaction effect between task difficulty and level of 
expertise on accuracy, while there is no significant interaction effect of the two variables on 
bias. Although experts were more accurate on the average than novices, both groups were 
inaccurate in moderate difficult and difficult tasks. According to the results, for both experts 
and novices accuracy degrades when the difficulty of the item increases. Hence, we can 
observe an effect of expertise on accuracy only on easy items, where experts were very close 
to perfect calibration. These findings are in contrast with the hypothesis that the interaction 
effect between difficulty and expertise would be observed on difficult items.  
With respect to bias, although a significant effect was not revealed, novices tended to 
underestimate their performance in easy items, in contrast to experts who tended to be 
unbiased. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis that easy items would provoke either 
no bias or underconfidence. However, in moderately difficult and difficult items both experts 
and novices tended to overestimate their performance, which is in contrast with the 
facilitative hypothesis. Due to the fact that a significant deterioration of calibration was 
observed in both groups of participants, these findings provide some support for the no 
impact hypothesis, suggesting that expertise does not interact with task difficulty and has no 
impact on bias. 
Summarizing, expertise seems to positively affect metacognitive accuracy, that task 
difficulty is an important factor in the deterioration of accuracy, that expertise and task 
difficulty do not interact in their effect on bias, and that both experts and novices have shown 
a pervasive tendency of overconfidence as item difficulty increased.  
 General discussion 
Regarding the first theoretical question whether expertise facilitates calibration or not, 
the answer is not clear. The findings of this research suggest that domain familiarity improves 
performance and metacognitive accuracy, but it does not affect bias. Experts were better 
calibrated than novices. A possible explanation could be that accuracy is linked to 
performance and expertise. Expertise provides the basis of making accurate metacognitive 
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judgements, while better performance makes metacognitive monitoring easier, as Nietfeld 
and Schraw (2002) noted. It could also be the case that cognitive resources available are those 
responsible for good estimates. When prior domain knowledge is acquired, cognitive 
resources that otherwise would be used for searching problem solutions, are now used for 
monitoring. ‘Experts are more automated problem solvers, which should yield more cognitive 
resources for monitoring one’s performance’ (Nietfeld & Schraw, 2002, p. 133). Another 
explanation, proposed by Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977), is that experts might be better 
calibrated because they have thought more about the topic area in question and, thus, they can 
more readily recognize the extent and the limitations of their knowledge.  
However, if experts possess the cognitive resources needed for accurate monitoring, 
the question remains what the reason for the bias observed. What is the cause for the 
overconfidence with increasing item difficulty? The first explanation could be that the richer 
mental schemas needed and possessed by experts to solve difficult problems, may restrain 
them from thinking of why they could be wrong (Spence, 1996). Due to their expertise, they 
may exaggerate their confidence. The second possible explanation for the overconfidence 
observed, is that of ‘Cognitive misers’. Experts were found to be overconfident, even more 
than less knowledgeable decision makers, due to their cognitive misery (Mahajan, in Spence, 
1996). According to Mahajan, they truncate information search, possibly because of 
excessive levels of confidence, and tend to make faster decisions. ’In the judging process they 
overlook diagnostic information which results in less accurate decisions’ (Spence, 1996, 
pp.277). A third possible explanation for experts’ overconfidence is ‘Self-classification 
hypothesis’ (Glenberg & Epstein, 1987). The hypothesis is that subjects, who classify 
themselves as relatively experts in a domain, use the belief that expertise is correlated with 
good performance in that domain to generate confidence ratings. This belief results to 
application of a less successful strategy for predicting performance. This hypothesis is also 
partially consistent with a negative relation between expertise and calibration (Glenberg & 
Epstein, 1987), supporting the debilitative hypothesis. 
After providing some possible explanations with respect to experts, there should be 
provided some explanations with respect to overconfidence observed in novices, as well. The 
first explanation could be that novices might be less able to judge the difficulty of the 
problem due to their lack of knowledge. Thus, they might have underestimated the difficulty 
in difficult tasks (even relied on non-physics/non-problem related features). A second 
possible explanation might be that they could have overestimated the power of their 
intellectual abilities (Dawes, in Keren, 1991) to solve the problem, resulting to the observed 
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overconfidence. Furthermore, the observed underconfidence in easy tasks could also be a 
result of problems with judging the difficulty of the tasks.  
In summary, experts provided better estimates about their performance than novices 
did, but as the difficulty increased, the calibration of their judgement was at the same level as 
novices. The pervasive tendency of overconfidence, revealed in earlier studies, was present in 
the findings of this study as well.  
Conclusions and implications  
 This experiment was conducted in order to examine what facilitates and what inhibits 
metacognitive accuracy. The pattern of the results supports the conclusion that task difficulty 
restrains accuracy, while expertise does not facilitate accuracy. The findings failed to show 
any reliable difference between domain familiar and unfamiliar participants on bias. 
 These findings have some general implications. A potential way to avoid 
overconfidence and improve calibration, independently of domain familiarity, would be by 
teaching metacognitive strategies. Teaching metacognitive strategies can be beneficial to 
monitoring, as they provide an explicit basis from which to evaluate one’s problem solving as 
Nietfeld and Schraw (2002) proposed. Also, Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1980) attempted to 
reduce overconfidence by providing their subjects with extensive training and feedback. It is 
important for future research to explore the possibility that learners can be trained to be better 
calibrated. However, future researchers should take into consideration the most disturbing 
conclusion from an overview of training studies: ‘Whatever modest improvements were 
achieved, were hardly ever generalized to other tasks’ (Keren, 1991, p.238). 
Limitations 
Several methodological factors can result in unreliability of metacognitive accuracy. 
One factor that should be taken into consideration by future researchers is the number of 
items included in the test material. There is a possibility that the 12 items used are not enough 
to reliably detect metacognitive accuracy. Another factor that should be examined is the 
number of participants. Due to the nature (voluntarily participation) and the time limitations 
of this study, including more participants was not possible. However, a larger number of 
participants could have enhanced the power of tests.  Last but not least, the two groups of 
participants differed on several background variables, such as gender, age and education 
level. The most evident difference between the two groups, however, concerned their level of 
Physics education, which was the basic ground for distinguishing between them in this 
experiment. 
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Appendix  
    Questionnaire 
1. When we jump forward out of a boat standing in water, it moves  
a) backward   
b) forward  
c) sideways 
d) none of above 
2. When a body is stationary describe the system of forces acting on it 
a) there are no forces acting on it  
b) the forces acting on are not in contact with it  
c) the combination of forces acting on it balance each other    
d) the body is in vacuum 
e) the net external forces is different from zero 
3. In which of the following is the pressure higher? 
a) At the bottom of a bottle of wine 
b) At the bottom of a bottle of water  
c) At the bottom of a bottle of gasoline 
d) At the bottom of a bottle of oil 
e) At the top of a bottle of water 
f) At the top of a bottle of oil 
 
4. We assume that we have an object sliding along a flat horizontal surface, which is solid but 
not smooth. The force of friction which acts between the mutual contact area of the two 
surfaces, depends on: 
a) the type of the surfaces of the objects 
b) the density of the object (defined as its mass per unit volume)  
c) the volume of the object (defined as its three dimensional space occupied by the object)  
d) the speed of the object 
e) the weight of the object 
f) a and e      
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g) b and d 
 
 5. When one swims across a flowing river, maximum energy is spent in  
a) first 1/3 of the distance 
b) second 1/3 of the distance  
c) last 1/3 of the distance  
d) equal energy is spent throughout  
e) dependence on the intensity of the flow 
 
6. We assume that we are on the top of a very high building and we let a feather fall down in 
the presence of the air. We also assume that there is no wind. Choose the best answer: 
 a) the velocity of the feather increases until it reaches ground 
b) the feather starts to  fall and reaches the ground with same  velocity  
c) the feather starts to fall with constant velocity and then accelerates until it reaches the 
ground 
d) the feather accelerates until it reaches maximum velocity 
 
7. A car travelling at constant velocity v suddenly brakes in an effort to keep from hitting a 
rabbit which is 8 ft away. If the braking action causes a constant deceleration a, how long 
does it take for the car to come to a complete stop?  
a) t = va  
b) t = 8a/v  
c) t = 8a  
d) t = v/a  
e) None of the above 
 
8. We assume that we sink vertically a ball deep into the water. As a result a force is 
produced that opposes to the downward movement of the ball. This force acting on our hand 
is equal to: 
a) the weight of the ball 
b) the weight of the dislocated water 
c) the weight of the ball plus the weight of the dislocated water 
d) the weight of the dislocated water minus the weight of the ball 
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9. A planet is moving around the Sun in a circular orbit of circumference C. The work done 
on the planet by the gravitational force F of the Sun is: 
a) FC 
b) 2FC 
c)  F/C 
d) Zero 
e) FC/2 
10. A car is moving in a high way with 80klm/h while another is moving to the opposite 
direction on the same high way with 100klm/h. Which is the relative velocity of the two cars? 
a )20 klm/h 
b) 80 klm/h 
c)100 klm/h 
d) 120 klm/h 
e) 180 klm/h 
 
11. We assume that there is a bicycle rider standing still on his bicycle on a flat horizontal 
non smooth street. The rider starts to cycle and accelerate. The bicycle’s back wheel touches 
the ground all the time and does not slide. The force of friction that occurs between the 
surface of the back wheel and the ground.. 
a) Is in the same direction as  the acceleration 
b) Is  in the opposite direction from the acceleration 
c) Is vertical to the direction of the acceleration 
d) there is no force of friction because the surfaces do not slide one on another 
 
12. If the distance between two masses is increased by a factor of 5, the gravitational force of 
attraction between them will:  
a) Increase by a factor of 5 
b) Increase by a factor 25 
c) Remain the same 
d) Reduce by a factor of 5 
e) Reduce by a factor of 25  
 
